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[Crim. No. 8152. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1964.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, T.ED PIERCE
et aI., Defendants and Respondents.
[1a,lb] Oouspiraq-Oriminal-Oouspiraq Between Husband and
Wife.-A husband and wife who conspire only between themselves against others cannot claim immunity from prosecntion
for conspiracy on the basis of their marital status. (Overruling People v. Ma7.ler, 82 Cal. 107 [22 P. 934] and disapproving People v. MacMunen, 134 Ca1.App; 81 [24 P.2d 794].)
[2] Id.-OrimiDal-Oonspiraq Between Husband and Wife.-A
wife is not a conspirator with her husband alone against
others unless her actions amount to active partiCipation transcending acts that would technically be sumcient to involve
her in a criminal conspiracy with him, but which might be far
removed from the arm's length agreement typical of that
crime.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County dismissing one count of an information charging a husband and wife with conspiracy. Ralph H. Nutter,
Judge. Reversed.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, William B.
McKesson, District Attorney, Harry Wood and Harry B.
Sondheim, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Russell E. Parsons for Defendants and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-The People appeal from an order of
the trial court dismissing count 1 of an information charging
defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy (Pen. Code,
§ 182, Bubds. 1 and 4) to violate Corporations Code section
26104, subflivision (a), and to commit grand theft (Pen.
Code, § 487, subd. 1).1
i

[1] Criminal conspiracy between spouses, note, 46 A.L.IUd
1275. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 18; Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 12.
McX. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Conspiracy, § 4.
lCounts 2 and 3 charged defendants with violations of Corporatioll8
Code section 26104, subdivision (a), and Pcnal Code section 487, 8obc1ivision 1.
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It bas been the rule in this state since 1889 (People y,;!j
MiUer, 82 Cal. 107, 108 [22 P. 934]) that when spouses con!":
spire only bet,veen themselves, they cannot be prosecuted for
conspiracy. (See also People v. MacMullen, 134 Cal.App. 81,"'
83-85 [24 P.2d 794].) The rule was based on the common-law
fiction that a husband alld a wife are one person. (1 Black-'
stollC Commentaries ·442; 2 Blackstolle, Commentaries ·433,)
The supposed merger precluded their conviction for con-,
spiracy, which requires "two or more persons." (Pen. Code,
§ 182.)2
The fictional unity of husband alld wife has been substantially vitiated by the overwhelmillg evidence that one plus
one adds up to two, even in twogetherness. Thus, one spouse
may recover against another in tort. (Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d
683 [26 Cal.Rptr. 97,376 P.2d 65] ; Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d
692 [26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70].) The reasoning is that
if he tortiously injures her, or vice versa, he or she does so
independently of her or him. The tortfeasor, though perhaps
not quite himself or herself at the time of the tort, is clearly
not one with the injured spouse. Indeed, the latter emerges
more separate than ever, now that injury has been added to
the usual marks of identity.
I
Likewise either spouse may be convicted of his or her cSrime
against the other. Thus, a husband can be convicted for in-'
fiicting corporal injury upon his wife (Pen. Code, § 273d),
for placing herin a house of prostitution (Pen. Code, § 266g),
or for failing to support her (Pen. Code, § 270a). Either
spouse may be convicted of his or her crime against the
property of the other. (People v. Graff, 59 Cal.App. 706, 712
[211 P. 829].) A husband and a wife may both be convicted of conspiracy when a third person is a party to the
conspiracy. (People v. Mason, 184 Ca1.App.2d 317, 367-368
[7 Cal.Rptr. 627], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [81 S.Ot. 1046,
6 L.Ed.2d 203].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband
can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife
(People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [281 P.2d 319]), and '
2The rule that a husband and a wife cannot be prosecuted for CODspiraey was questioned early in this eentury (8mith Y. 8tate{1905) 48
Tex.Crim.Rep. 288, 289-240 [89 S.W. 817, 820-821]) and was first judicililly rejected in 1920 (Dalton Y. People, 68 Colo. 44, 47 [189 P. 87,
88]). Since then, two other states (Mark8 v. 8tate (1942) 144 Tex.
Crim.Rep. 509, 514 [164 S.W.2d 690, 692]; People v. Martin (1954)
4 IlI.2d 105, 109 [122 N.E.~d 245, 246]) and the Supreme Court of
the United States have rejected it. (UfI.{ted 8tate8 v. Dege (]960) 8M
U.S. 5], 54-55 [80 B.Ct. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1568, 1565-1566].)
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the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires
with others against her husband.
[1a] The present case involves, not one spouse who has
conspired with third persons against the other spouse, but
a husband and wife who together have conspired against
others. They now raise the stale contention that they should
be protected from the law of conspiracy in the interest of
their domestic harmony. The law, however, poses no threat
to their domestic harmony in lawful pursuits. It would be
ironic indeed if the law could operate to grant them absolution from criminal behavior on the ground that it was attended by close harmony. Their situation is akin to that of
a husband and wife who can both be punished for committing
a crime when one abets the other. (People v. Eppstein, 108
Cal.App. 72,80 [290 P. 1054].) Moreover, even in such situations domestic harmony is amply protected, since, with certain exceptions not relevant here, one spouse cannot testify
against the other without the consent of both. (Pen. Code,
§ 1322.)
It would be specious to distinguish the present case, involving the conspiracy of a husband and wife against others, on
the ground that however separate their identities, they must
be deemed one when they act together for a common objective. If such an argument could be invoked to absolve people
linked in marriage it could as readily be invoked to absolve
people linked in any other close association, as in a secret
society. Of course the closeness of the association intensifies
the conspirator's involvement, but it is hardly reasonable to
absolve a conspirator from responsibility on the ground that
he had an exceptionally high interest in bringing the conspiracy to fruition. Any conspirator may sacrifice much,
and perhaps most, of his personality for that objective. His
very role as a conspirator is likely to be at odds with his
individuality, whether he be a spouse, a bachelor, or a spinster.
There is nothing in the contemporary mores of married life
in this· state to indicate that either a husband or a wife is
more subject to losing himself or herself in the criminal
schemes of his or her spouse than a bachelor or a spinster
is to losing himself or herself in the criminal schemes of
fellow conspirators. Spousehood may afford a cover for criminal conspiracy. It should not also afford automatically a
blanket of immuMty from criminal responsibility.
Certainly there should be no automatic immunity on the
assumption that a wife invariably acts under the compUlsion
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of her husband, particularly in view of the advanced status:!
of married women in this state. (See United States v. Dege, :
supra, 364 U.S. 51,53 [80 S.Ot. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1563, 1565].) j
It bears emphasis that, conversely, courts still have the
sponsibility to guard against applying the law of conspiracy j
to a wife solely on the ground that she has acted without '
compulsion. There may be situations where a wife is aware
of her husband's illegal activity and even passively helpful
to him in the everyday acts incident to marriage. [2] Nevertheless she is not a conspirator unless her actions amount to
active participation transcending acts that "would technically
be sufficient to involve her in a criminal conspiracy with him,
but which might be far removed from the arm's-length agreement typical of that crime." (United States v. Dege, supra,'
364 U.S. 51, 57-58 [80 S.Ot. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1563, 1567]
(dissenting opinion); see also Krulewitck v. United States,
336 U.S. 440, 445 [69 S.Ot. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790, 795] (concur-:,
ring opinion).)
[lb] Defendants finally contend that the long-established
rule formulated by this court that would afford them immunity, should not now be overruled except by the Legislature. In effect the contention is a request that courts
abdicate their responsibility for the upkeep of the com- ,'"
mon law. That upkeep it needs continuously, as this cas(
demonstrates. In view of the fact that the fiction underlyin~, ,,'
the rule in question has long been dead, we overrule People v.
Miller, .upra, 82 Cal. 107, and disapprove People v. MtJOMulZen, .t1tpra, 134 Cal.App. 81. We hold that even when a
husband and wife conspire only between themselves, they
cannot claim immunity from prosecution for conspiracy on
the basis of their marital status.
The order is reversed.

re-'1

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Schauer, J.,.
and Dooling, J.,. concurred.

-Retired Justice of the 8upremeCourt sitting under aasignm.8Jlt b7
the Chairman of the Judieia1 CouncU.
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